Some economists have advocated the use of measures of genetic dissimilarity to guide species preservation priorities. It is argued here that such policies are: i) possible for only a very small number of species for which data are available; ii) impractical as a general guide to biodiversity preservation for that reason and because it is impossible, given the present state of knowledge, to account for species interdependence; and, critically, iii) misguided because, at least over the relatively small species sets for which data exist, there are generally no established or theoretically convincing relationships between genetic dissimilarity and species value.
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Introduction
Biologists have so far described some 1.75 million species, though the number of extant species almost certainly exceeds this figure by a large factor. Estimates vary from 3.5 to 111.5 (Hawksworth and Kalin-Arroyo, 1995) but a consensus appears to be in the region of 12.5 -13.5 million (Hammond, 1992; Hawksworth and Kalin-Arroyo, 1995; Stork, 1995) . An acute lack of taxonomic resources (Wheeler and Cracraft, 1997 ) means that our knowledge of the living world, even in the limited sense of identifying and describing species, amounts to little more than a scratch on the surface. Species extinctions are now occurring so fast -between 1,000 and 10,000 times the `normal' rate, according to May, et al. (1995) -that we are almost certainly losing species that we did not even know existed. The sheer magnitude of these numbers together with the depth of our ignorance mean that any attempt to place a value on one species relative to all others and, hence, a set of logical economic priorities for individual species conservation, is inevitably a task that will never be fulfilled.
Policy makers are faced not only with the daunting problem of magnitude. Species do not exist in isolation nor, typically, in simple bilateral relationships (predator-prey, hostparasite, etc.) . More often they participate in highly complex inter-dependent webs.
Deleting (or, adding) a species may have considerable ramifications for the existence of many other species and for the health and resilience of entire habitats and ecosystems.
An understanding of the scale and complexity of the biota is essential to the formulation of practical policies for preserving biodiversity. 1 A casual review of the literature would suggest that this understanding is commonplace amongst ecologists but less so amongst economists. As a consequence, many economists have focused on the individual components or sub-sets of diversity, rather as they might the individual agents or subunits of an economy; i.e., they have taken a somewhat `micro' perspective. The result is a piecemeal approach that has little hope of making a serious assault on the problem within a time scale that would allow us to avoid a potential catastrophe. Just as a shortage of taxonomic inputs prevents us from identifying more than a small fraction of individual species, so a shortage of applied economic inputs would surely rule out the 2 valuation of more than a small fraction of those species. Urgency and practicality demand action at regional and global levels directed by a more `macro' or `ecological'
perspective. Such an approach may be less precise but more likely to achieve a tolerable outcome.
Within the economics literature it is possible to identify two broad and generally complementary approaches to bio-diversity: the traditional cost-benefit analysis and a more recent approach based on the measurement of genetic diversity. The merits and drawbacks of the cost-benefit approach have been widely discussed (for example, Diamond and Hausmann, 1994, and Goulder and Kennedy, 1997) and this paper focuses on the second contribution. The objective of this approach is to find the least-cost way of preserving diversity within a particular taxon collection (typically a set of species: say a family of birds). Apart from a measure of diversity, this requires estimates of the extinction probabilities of individual species in order to calculate expected diversity at future dates and, hence, the change in expected diversity arising from a change in extinction probabilities. If the cost of changing extinction probabilities is known, then it is possible to maximise expected diversity per dollar spent on conservation on the particular set of species.
The essence of the argument in this paper is that preservation policies based on genetic dissimilarity between species are: i) possible for only a very small number of species for which data are available; ii) impractical as a general guide to biodiversity preservation both for that reason and because it is impossible, given the present state of knowledge, to account for species interdependence; and, crucially, iii) misguided because, at least over the relatively small species sets for which data exist, there are generally no empirically established or theoretically convincing relationships between genetic dissimilarity and species value. The paper proceeds as follows. The next section considers three particular concepts or sources of value which have been suggested as correlates of biodiversity. Section three gives a brief outline of the genetic-diversity approach. Section four argues that it is difficult to establish a convincing relationship between any of the three categories of value and genetic diversity over relatively small sub-sets of species. Section five examines the problem of species interaction and interdependence and shows how these magnify the practical problems of estimating genetic losses from individual species extinctions.
3 Section six concludes with some observations on the impracticality of attempting microbased optimisation and argues for a broader approach to biodiversity protection.
The Value of Biodiversity
Cost-benefit analysis attempts to put a present money value on an individual or some appropriate taxon (usually a species) or a habitat. The sources of value are welldocumented (Brown and Shogren, 1998) and include: `use values' such as harvesting (for food, construction materials and pharmaceuticals), sport and recreation, and aesthetic pleasure; `existence value' -the satisfaction from simply knowing that something exists even if it is not personally used; and `option value', which reflects a willingness to pay for possible but uncertain benefits. Option values could arise from any of the benefits already mentioned, but medicinal products appear to be the most important (Brown and Goldstein, 1984; Polasky et al., 1993; and Simpson et al., 1996) .
Many cost-benefit studies are concerned with the net social valuation of individual species preservation. What appears to be much less practised, probably because it is less understood, are studies on the extent to which biodiversity (in the sense not merely of variety but also of interdependence) helps in sustaining ecosystem services. While ecologists are well-aware of the importance of ecosystem services, and the supporting role of bio-diversity (see, among many others, Erlich and Mooney, 1983; Erlich and Wilson, 1991; Reaka-Kudla et al., 1997; and Daily, 1997) , this awareness has been slower to filter through to economists (Costanza, 1991; Folke et al., 1992; Perrings, 1995; and Gowdy, 1997 , are examples from a much shorter list). Three recent articles on the US Endangered Species Act (Brown and Shogren, 1998; Metrick and Weitzman, 1998; and Innes et al., 1998) do not mention the issue, maybe reflecting the way in which policy has also been formulated.
These ecosystem services are immense and extraordinarily complex. They include: the regulation of climate via ocean currents and atmospheric cycles; the maintenance of the gaseous composition of the atmosphere via the inter-related workings of the carbon, oxygen, nitrogen, sulphur and hydrological cycles; the formation and retention of soils and the maintenance of soil fertility via the nitrogen cycle and the activity of micro-organisms; the breakdown and recycling of organic matter by micro-organisms; provision of fresh water via the hydrological cycle; flood control via flood-plains and wetlands; insect 4 pollination of food crops; pest-control via natural predators; and the maintenance of a genetic library. In the view of many ecologists (Naeem et al., 1994; Tilman and Downing, 1994; Holling et al., 1995) , biodiversity is critical to the continued healthy provision of these natural services. The substitution of these services in their entirety is well beyond human capability so that a total valuation is meaningless. What might, meaningfully, be done is to consider the contribution of an individual species, or an individual habitat, to maintaining the quality of such services and to place a value on that contribution, assuming it to be non-critical in terms of human survival. Although such an exercise would be meaningful, the results it yields are unlikely to be so for reasons explained below.
A final source, or more accurately, set of sources of value of (some or all) individuals, species, habitats and ecosystems we shall refer to as `inherent' value. Although this term is sometimes used synonymously with `intrinsic' value, it is used here (for reasons which should become clear) to cover both intrinsic and `transformative' value. Intrinsic value is advocated by those who adopt a non-anthropocentric view of values in relation to the natural world. Transformative value has been advocated by , who describes it as `weakly anthropocentric', and refers to the capacity of nature to transform existing preferences in a positive way (see also Costanza and Folke, 1997) . Despite their differences, these sources of value have one thing in common: neither is captured by traditional cost-benefit analysis. This implies not only an anthropocentric viewpoint but is also predicated on the existence of given and fixed preferences (Goulder and Kennedy, 1997) .
Cost-benefit analysis does not generally attempt to relate value directly to diversity as such. But over the last decade, some economists have claimed that a measure of biological diversity is essential for accurate economic assessments of preservation policies on the grounds that diversity is positively correlated with some category of value.
The major (economic) contributions to this literature are : Weitzman, (1992 : Weitzman, ( ,1993 : Weitzman, ( , 1998 ; Metrick and Weitzman, (1996, 1998) ; Solow et al., (1993) and Polasky et al., (1993) . In principle, any category of value could be a positive correlate of diversity, though Weitzman (1993) appears to be motivated by some notion of inherent value, whereas Solow et al., Polasky et al., Weitzman (1992) and, though this is far from explicit, (1998) are concerned with option values. None of these papers acknowledges explicitly the diversity-based value of ecosystem services. The approach could be thought of as providing improved information on costs and benefits but, in Weitzman at least, diversity-5 related values are considered to be additional to those obtained by more conventional methods.
The detailed development of these approaches shows no lack of ingenuity, but there must be considerable doubts as to their practicality or, indeed, their efficiency in the sense of reaching globally optimal solutions. The remainder of this paper is devoted to an exploration of these doubts.
The Genetic-Diversity Approach
Ecologists have traditionally used a variety of measures of diversity for a given taxon that have not relied on genetic measurements but on taxa counts (e.g., species counts) (see, for example, Magurran,1988) .The variety of measures arises from the fact that they attempt to capture two variables, species richness (the number of individual species) and species density (the relative abundance of each species). Despite the recent, albeit limited, availability of genetic measures, many biologists continue to work with conventional measures and, indeed, express a preference for using both conventional and genetic indicators (Solow et al., 1993, p.64 ). In the recent economic literature, however, analyses are based almost exclusively on the latter. number of nodes between the root and the final branch, the idea being that more nodes imply a clustering or `clade' of like (and, therefore, not unusual) species. Thus in Figure   1 , A would have higher priority than E. 3 Crozier (1992) pointed out that this criterion relied excessively on taxonomic knowledge and judgements concerning speciation. He proposed instead to base priority on genetic dissimilarity/distance between species as measured, for example, by substitution rates for DNA sequences. On the plausible 6 hypothesis that genetic distances are related to the branch lengths on the evolutionary tree, branch length can be used as a visual representation of distance. Thus, in Figure 1 , A and C have the same node count yet C branched off at an earlier date and has had a longer period of separate evolution. Individual branch lengths would suggest that C should have higher priority than A.
The advantage of genetic dissimilarity measures is that, starting with basic genetic data, they allow the evolutionary tree to be constructed via cluster analysis as a `dendrogram' (Pielou, 1984) and do not rely on conventional taxonomic methods. Crozier's paper and
Weitzman's first contribution to the subject were published in the same year (1992) -an interesting case of independent researchers reaching remarkably similar conclusions.
But whereas Crozier (following Vane-Wright et al.) confined his policy prescription to the observation that "areas should be chosen for reserves not simply on the basis of number of species but also on the distinctiveness of the species", Weitzman's analytical apparatus is intended as the basis for clear-cut microeconomic policy decisions.
Weitzman has developed his approach over a series of papers, though readers might find his 1993 article the most useful in understanding the potential for the practical application of his ideas. This article focuses on a single family of well-studied birds -cranesconsisting of fifteen species . 4 It should be noted that cranes exist in many countries and some are migratory over long distances. Weitzman uses a measure of genetic distance between species, according to base-pair mismatch of underlying DNA, together with a unique algorithm for constructing a dendrogram which is interpreted as an evolutionary tree, as in Figure 1 . The tree shows distinct clades within the fifteen species.
Using extinction probabilities for each species over some time horizon, plus an assumed discount rate, Weitzman then calculates an "expected present discounted diversity function", showing expected diversity of any set of cranes as a function of the extinction probabilities, genetic distances and the discount factor. 5 The function is, of course, a measure of diversity and not (yet) of money value. To convert the former into the latter requires a clear understanding of why, or how, diversity creates or embodies value. This ambitious step is not taken in the 1993 paper. Instead, preservation diagnostics are obtained by calculating marginal diversity indicators (mdis), which relate changes in expected diversity to small changes in extinction probabilities, such changes being the objective of conservation. Although "an optimal strategy might select projects to maximise present discounted diversity subject to something like a budget constraint", such an exercise is thwarted by lack of cost information. Nevertheless, interesting (and paradoxical) conclusions emerge from the mdis :
Certain highly endangered species may have low mdis because of the existence of less endangered relatives.
i. Species currently in receipt of high protection (usually in rich countries) are not necessarily those with high mdis.
i. Paradoxically, it may make more sense to direct greater preservation effort to a relatively safe species than to an endangered but closely related species. This might be the least-cost way of ensuring the survival of a particular gene clade.
In subsequent papers (Weitzman, 1998; Metrick and Weitzman, 1996, 1998 ) a more comprehensive preservation rule is advocated, in the form of a species ranking index R i , according to the formula
where C i is the cost of a preservation action that changes the probability of survival of species i by ∆P i . U i is a utility measure of those characteristics of i that are independent of its contribution to diversity (perhaps those revealed by traditional cost-benefit analysis), while D i is a measure of that contribution (effectively a measure of the genetic distance between i and its nearest `neighbour'). In introducing this formula, Weitzman asks us, parenthetically, to "imagine somehow that D i has been made commensurate with U i ".
Adding heterogeneous quantities is a central problem of economics, resolved through valuation, i.e., conversion to a common metric. Nowhere, as far as I can see is this key task addressed. To attempt it necessitates a return to the fundamental question of why we value diversity per se.
Finding Value in Diversity
There would appear to be three, not mutually exclusive, contenders for locating value in diversity: inherent value, option value and the value of ecosystem services. We consider each in turn.
Inherent value
Weitzman motivates his 1993 paper with the observation that "many people believe that there is some inherent value in preserving diversity, even though they cannot exactly 8 define what it is." Indeed, he stresses that other values, "use value, existence value, and so forth" are not part of the value of diversity. Since no mention is made of option value or ecosystem services (unless they be part of the "so forth"), then it would appear that the approach in this paper is predicated on the belief that there is inherent value in diversity.
He then says: "As economists, either we can walk away from this problem on the grounds that there is an ambiguity in the basic concept, or we can attempt to put some structure on the concept of diversity." This, in itself, is a non sequitur. However much structure is placed on the concept of diversity, we are no nearer identifying, understanding or quantifying the inherent value of diversity. Given that other instrumental sources of value are ruled out by Weitzman, the only remaining candidates for generating inherent value would appear to be intrinsic and transformative values.
Whether diversity has intrinsic value remains an open philosophical question. Nonanthropocentric arguments deriving intrinsic value from the rights and/or interests of natural organisms (e.g., Singer, 1975 ) attribute values to individuals rather than species, while attempts to value collections such as species or habitats (e.g., Callicot, 1987 ) have proved unconvincing. Returning to Weitzman, it is possible (indeed, probable) that his intention, in the last quoted remark, was to say: let us take inherent value for granted and try to find a way of making preservation decisions operational. But the matter is not so simple. There is no unique measure of diversity, and unless we know how and why diversity gives rise to inherent value it is not at all clear how we should operationalise the concept. For example, if inherent value, following Norton, arises from the ability of nature to transform felt preferences, then presumably it is those attributes of species that stimulate the human senses that are important. In that case, inherent value would be positively related to a diversity of morphological characteristics but not necessarily to genetic diversity. A preservation choice over winged insects might lead to a concentration on butterflies and moths and the complete elimination of mosquitoes and flies. In the absence of a clear justification for the assumption that inherent value is a positive correlate of genetic diversity, it has to be asked why, precisely, is the latter a relevant concept.
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Option values
The case for preserving option values is made explicitly by Crozier (1992) in introducing his advocacy of a genetic dissimilarity measure of diversity but he says nothing about how the two issues are connected. Weitzman (1992) links his algorithm for generating an evolutionary tree to the problem of finding a pharmacological cure for a disease. His argument, however, proceeds on the implausible assumption that evolution does not change the biochemical make-up of organisms but merely adds to it; that is, "once a cure is contained in a parent node, then it is fixed or locked into all of the subsequent offspring nodes". It follows immediately that a high degree of genetic redundancy, from an optionvalue point of view, is built into a group of closely related species. Option values are also central to the various writings of Solow, Polasky and Broadus. In Polasky et al. (1993) , individuals from a set of closely related species are assumed to yield benefits (if any) that are perfect substitutes. 10 It is hardly surprising that they conclude that the total option value of a wide set of species is an increasing function of the diversity of that set.
On the other hand, Polasky and Solow (1995) noted that drug companies, aware of the success in deriving the anti-cancer drug taxol from the Pacific yew, had focused prospecting efforts on relatives of that species. To account for such behaviour, they allowed related species to yield benefits which are imperfect substitutes, while letting the probability of finding a benefit in species i be inversely related to i's genetic distance from a known beneficial species, j. Yet it turns out that these assumptions, on their own, are insufficient to account for the revealed behaviour of drugs prospectors. This is because, somewhat contrarily, they invoke a further assumption that "only the species with the highest value will be used", which ensures that option redundancy re-enters by the back door.
At the macro level, i.e., the level of the entire biota, few people would argue with the proposition that option value increases with diversity. For humankind, seeking a wide range of potential benefits -foods, materials, drugs -that must surely be so. But at the micro level, the level of relatively small sets of species, wherein is exercised the practical "agony of choice" (of the sort: "which of fifteen cranes shall have priority?"), it is not at all obvious that the conclusion or the assumptions on which it is based are reasonable.
Moreover, it appears to be inconsistent with revealed expected profit-maximising behaviour.
In the perfect-substitutes case, search ends after the first successful `hit'. In the imperfect-substitutes case, continued search depends on the expected return from finding an improved version. Neither of these approaches can account for a single species yielding several distinct but related cures, as in the case of two potent anti-cancer drugs derived from the Madagascan rosy periwinkle (Myers, 1997) nor, by extension, related species yielding products with distinct but related uses (say two anti-cancer drugs neither of which dominates the other therapeutically). 11 For our limited purposes we can formulate the matter very simply. Suppose, following Polasky and Solow, that the probability P i (j) of finding a benefit in species i, given the existence of a benefit derived from species j, is an inverse function of the genetic distance between i and j, d(i,j):
Plausibly, the value of i, or more accurately, the net additional value of i given the known existence of j, V i (j), would be an increasing function of genetic distance:
Then the expected value of i is
That is, given an initial discovery, j, option value may increase or decrease with the diversity of the set containing j, or may even vary non-monotonically. (By allowing f[d(j,j)] > 0 we can account for cases such as that of the rosy periwinkle.) The precise nature of f [ . ] in any particular case is an empirical matter. As noted above, over very large distances it would seem plausible to assume that f' > 0; but that is far from obvious for relatively small neighbourhoods of j. Within the set of (say) temperate coniferous trees, known to contain the beneficial Pacific yew, would prospectors prefer to preserve two other unexamined yew species or one each of spruce and larch?
We know, in fact, that the Pacific yew gave very small and unsustainable yields of taxol, but the closely related European yew is more productive of the same substance and capable of being harvested (Bisby and Coddington, 1995) . These authors also cite the case of anti-HIV substances from an Australian species of legume. Following correct predictions, phytochemists found similar chemicals in a related South American plant.
These examples show that if a given species has yield limitations then genetically close relatives are far from having option redundancy. Of course, yields will not be known in advance of finding the drug.
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Ecosystem services
As with option values, our initial intuition might be that species that are genetically similar would be very close substitutes in terms of providing ecosystem services. Genes may be thought of as bits of information or technology needed to produce these services, in which case it is better to have the complementary bits than the substitutable ones. If that is so, our best guarantee of maintaining ecosystem health would be to ensure a genetically diverse range of species. The corollary is that species with close existing relatives have low or zero marginal value in sustaining ecosystems. This is consistent with the hypothesis of the functional redundancy of species due to Walker (1992) . The redundancy literature suggests that a species is otiose if it performs the same ecological function as another species. This may be because of similar competitive ability or because of extreme niche overlap. In the present context, both of these possibilities could be related to genetic similarity. But does this argument hold? Here, we cite evidence of micro-level processes that suggest that it does not.
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In a study of a Pennsylvanian creek, Sweeney and Vannote (1981) found about 50 species of mayfly present throughout the year. The mayflies undergo their development cycles at different times so that, at any one time, one or more mayflies would be grazing on diatoms and, in turn, providing quarry for larger predators. The diatoms themselves are present in many species and each species reaches its greatest density at different times of the year. Functional redundancy might imply that a large proportion of the diatom species and/or a large proportion of the mayfly species could be deleted without a serious effect on the functioning of this local ecosystem. But species multiplicity ensures that nutrient transfer is accomplished throughout the year and an interruption of that process may imply more than a seasonal suspension of the system's functioning.
It is generally appreciated that genetic variations within species and even within populations (which necessarily refer to relatively minor variation) are effective in: i)
reducing species/population susceptibility to disease pathogens (Browning, 1991) which has both ecosystem and, in the case of commercial crops, option value; and ii) increases the ability to respond to environmental stress (Sork et al., 1993) . A remarkable example of the importance of fine adaptation is provided by Moore et al (1998) concerning phytoplankton, the major primary producers in tropical and sub-tropical waters. As explained by Fuhrman and Campbell (1998) , the reason why they are so successful is because of "the coexistence of closely related populations that are genetically adapted to remarkably different light levels". It appears that "differences of only about 2% in 16S
rRNA sequence correspond to ecologically significant physiological diversity…..there are instances where organisms with even completely identical 16S rRNA sequences occupy different niches." Like mayflies and diatoms, minimally diverse phytoplankton undertake complementary rather than substitute functions within their particular ecosystem.
In a recent paper, Koenig and Haydock (1999) show that the population stability of the Californian acorn woodpecker depends not so much on the overall density of oak trees but on the diversity of oak species. In the face of random crop failures, woodpeckers, like investors benefit from a `balanced portfolio'. This does not demonstrate that more than one species of oak is essential but it does appear that the marginal value of a related species is much higher than was thought for this forest ecosystem.
All of these studies can, correctly, be interpreted as evidence of the importance of genetic diversity. What they do not do is to support the idea that ecosystem value is positively related to genetic distance over relatively small species or population sub-sets.
Removing one of an assemblage of close relatives may destroy an ecosystem as effectively as deleting a unique taxon: n closely related taxa may have greater survival chances in the face of pathogenic attack than n isolated and distant ones. Admittedly, the evidence is tentative. But it is sufficient for us to guard against paradoxes of the sort offered by Weitzman (1993) .
14 What holds for close relatives within a given ecosystem holds a fortiori for close relatives occupying distinct ecosystems. Consider the example used to illustrate this paradox.
According to Weitzman, the endangered central-African black-crowned crane has a much lower marginal diversity index than its safer grey-crowned close relative of southern Africa. Preservation efforts directed to the latter may be the more cost effective way of ensuring survival of this gene clade. This may be true, but it may also be beside the point. Without knowing the role each crane plays in its local ecosystem, and the broader value of the services of each system, comparing the species' mdis does not tell us how to maximise the value of services per conservation dollar. 15 (To go to the opposite extreme, it may be that distinct clades or families, such as the pandas, could actually represent evolutionary dead-ends, making little contribution to their local ecosystems.)
As with intrinsic value and option value, the case has yet to be made that the marginal value of the ecosystem services provided by a species is an increasing function of its genetic distance from another species.
Bio-complexity
Despite the reservations of the preceding section suppose, for the sake of continued argument, that a measure of genetic diversity is the appropriate concept to work with. We must then confront a further problem: species interdependence. Suppose we take the family of fifteen cranes and maximise the present discounted diversity of this set subject to a given conservation budget. Doing so may involve the expected loss of a subset of the family. Does that tell us how much genetic diversity is lost and how much is saved for the biota as a whole? It is well known that species deletion has spillover effects for other species (for example, Pimm, 1986) . The implications of species deletion depends on the trophic level of the species and on what Pimm calls the `connectance' of food webs, by which is meant the number of pathways by which energy flows through the web.
Following Pimm, consider the web { carnivore ! herbivore ! plant }. Deletion of the carnivore would initially lead to an increase in the herbivore population and thus the initiation of a Lotka-Volterra dynamic between it and the plant. Damped oscillations would eventually establish a new equilibrium in which both survive. By contrast, in the web { carnivore ! herbivore ! many plants }, deletion of the carnivore could allow the herbivore to eliminate one plant species without threatening its own extinction. As a consequence, we would lose not only the genetic value of the top predator but also that of the extinct plant.
One might think it possible, in principle, to calculate these spillover effects as one would obtain a multiplier effect from an input-output matrix. But unlike the rival and linear commodity-process interactions in a Leontief model, species-function interactions are extraordinarily complex, involving non-rivalries (joint inputs and joint outputs) and nonlinearities. Moreover, biologists are far from clear about the significance of interactions, with increasing evidence that so-called `weak' interactions (interactions which appear on the surface to be weak) may be crucial for sustaining system stability. This has been shown theoretically by McCann et al. (1998) in a non-linear food-web model. They find that "weak links act to dampen oscillations between consumers and resources. This tends to maintain population densities further away from zero, decreasing the statistical chance that a population will become extinct." An empirical finding that points in the same direction is reported by Berlow (1999) , who looked at an inter-tidal food web on the Oregon coast. It was found that the greatest variation in species effect occurred for the weakest interactions, an outcome attributed to the stabilising or `noise-dampening' roles of such interactions.
What is important about these recent results is that they point to the remarkable ignorance we have of species interdependence. Solow et al. (1993) do recognise that species extinctions are not independent and that this needs to be reflected in conservation strategies. But, other than reference to `keystone' species, there is no acknowledgement of how formidable an undertaking that would be. (In their illustrative application to cranes, extinctions are assumed to be independent.)
If "no man is an island entire unto himself," then neither is a species. The cumulative genetic loss from one species extinction may well be (in a real practical sense) incalculable, particularly for migratory species, like some cranes, which require a multiplicity of habitats.
Optimal versus Deliverable Solutions
We have still to touch on the question posed by the sheer number of species (literally millions), most of which have not been identified, let alone documented. Yet biodiversity means the diversity of all life forms and implies a concern with the entire range of species. Even if no species were critically dependent on any other, reliance on a genetic dissimilarity approach would require -for a first-best solution -the calculation of a diversity index for the entire set of species. This is clearly impossible given not only the 15 depth of our ecological ignorance but also the inadequacy of the resources to complete the task.
What then can be learnt from measuring genetic dissimilarity within very small sub-sets of the entire set of species? Given a budget constraint (and ignoring all previous anxieties), this knowledge provides a way of determining priorities within the sub-set. What it does not do is to say how much money should be poured into the budget in the first place. Are cranes deserving of $100m whereas spiders merit only $10m? Precise optimisation within budgets makes little sense when the partitioning of the budgets is arbitrary or illinformed. It is perfectly possible, following standard second-best logic, that piece-meal, localised optimisation may reduce the efficiency of the global outcome. When the problems of identifying a local value-variety function and of tracking down speciesspecies and species-ecosystem interactions are factored back in, it seems probable that the resulting solutions will be far from even second-best. Optimal deletion within a set of birds may lead to more-than-offsetting deleterious changes in the set of insects or of plants which are hosts to those insects. The fact is, we simply don't know.
It may be countered that, given the complexity and urgency of the problem, any solution will prove far from optimal. That, of course, is true. However, the sheer weight of species numbers and the (still inadequately understood) complexity of their interaction suggest that an achievable and tolerable solution will be one which focuses on biodiversity en bloc, i.e., on habitats and ecosystems. This may mean particular attention to biodiversitỳ hotspots' and key biomes, and important local and global ecosystems. 16 More generally, it requires the identification and protection of a variety of habitats worldwide. Diversity measures based on cluster analysis, like that of Weitzman, can be applied equally to habitats as to species (Pielou, 1986) and could assist the process of prioritisation.
Valuation of ecosystems may also be amenable to innovative approaches such as that by
Perrings and Stern (forthcoming) on the Botswana rangelands, which incorporates both option value and ecosystem services considerations. In this approach, biodiversity changes are reflected in some observable `output' change, such as agricultural productivity. The mix of species is then implicitly evaluated for its capacity to maintain ecosystem productivity in response to stress. Since the ecosystem is valued in terms of derived for the output, value can be imputed to its ecological diversity without excessive reliance on knowledge about the components of the ecosystem or their interaction.
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The question of how best to protect ecosystems has been addressed in detail elsewhere: Gowdy (1997); ; Perrings et al (1992); and Swanson (1995) . Part of the problem is identifying the geographical level at which to frame policy. This is because some localised ecosystems are relatively autonomous whereas others, such as the equatorial forests, play a major role in providing global ecosystem services. In the former case, habitat destruction and fragmentation can be ameliorated or avoided by a variety of measures: population control, agricultural intensification, the creation or revision of property rights, etc. At a global level, income redistribution, environment-related aid and debt-for-nature swaps need to be assessed and compared, and the institution of global property rights and quasi-markets investigated. Such approaches do not tell us how much to preserve or where on the economic-growth/environmental-protection trade-off to aim for -but then neither does the genetic diversity approach. But they will almost certainly have lower information requirements and yield a better `balance' of protection of both species and habitats.
Finally, for those who insist that in an uncertain world one second-best approach is as good as another and that diversity has much to commend itself in the choice of approach as it does in nature, I wish to re-iterate the central concern of this critique. The literature has assumed rather than established a monotonic value-diversity function over small domains. If it is to give credible policy guidance, such a relationship needs to be demonstrated as a general rule. Effectively, we need convincing proof that species generally have near-redundancy on account of their genetic similarity to others. Without such proof, preservation recommendations based on genetic dissimilarity may prove tragically misguided.
8. This belief would seem to be consistent with Wilson's notion of `biophilia' (1984;  see also Kellert and Wilson,1993) .
9. Norton, it should be said, does not attempt to justify a species ranking on this (or any other basis). His arguments against such rankings partly overlap with those expressed here. Preservation of mosquitoes is justified on the grounds that they are an integral part of the biotic `whole'.
10.
Complete option redundancy is also built into the assumptions of Simpson, et al.(1996) : once a cure for a specified ailment is found, there is no value to finding another. (Their approach is not based on a genetic-based measure of diversity.)
11.
Moreover, as noted by Simpson et al. (1996) , in support of their redundancy assumption, medicinally similar compounds may arise from parallel morphological development, within a given ecological niche, of species that need not be genetic neighbours.
12.
It is true that genes of interest are increasingly susceptible of transfer from their host via recombinant DNA technology into yeast/bacteria, etc. It could then be argued that a drug company's interest in a plant's close cousins may be motivated by a desire to protect its patent interests rather than obtain yields. To the extent that the argument is valid it actually undermines the case for preserving diversity in the wild since many gene pools can be preserved in zoos, arboreta, etc.
13.
For more general reservations on the redundancy literature, see Gitay et al (1996) .
14.
To be fair, we should recall that Weitzman's 1993 paper, which propounds this paradox, is motivated by inherent value and not, apparently, by the value of ecosystem services.
15.
Norton makes a similar point in relation to evolutionary potential: "Viewed through time, a species existing in two different ecosystems can be seen as two different units of diversity" (1987, p. 260) .
